A Saudi-led coalition airstruck a port city in southern Yemen, the port of Mukalla, on 30 December, hitting a transport of arms destined for the southern separatists, but a delicate peace in the Gulf was rattled. Riyadh said the weapons and supplies were for the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and they were fired from Emirati ports, but the UAE has denied the claim and protested against the attack.
The strike had repercussions that were not only diplomatic and military, as Abu Dhabi announced plans to pull its remaining troops in Yemen and Riyadh stepped up its involvement with actors sympathetic to the STC, while the international community called for restraint as regional fault lines grew.
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Allies Without Anchors
What is important about this episode is not so much the strike itself but the breakdown in coordination between two Gulf partners who have been a key to regional policies for the past decade. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were close partners in the fight against the Houthis, but are not getting along today, with Riyadh calling for a centralised regional order and a strong push on border security while Abu Dhabi, which tried to differentiate itself from its Saudi counterpart, is looking to exert regional influence via local allies and security hubs.
The divide was revealed during the Mukalla incident, when the Saudis defended the move as a national security measure to prevent the supply of weapons to dangerous forces that would cross their borders, while Abu Dhabi described the fallout as an “oversight” and a “mistake.” They now propose that the two capitals are following different strategic models, one based on consolidation of the State and the other on networked influence, and suggest that there may be a low-level, gradual competition across the theatres from the Horn of Africa to Yemen.
When Proxy Lines Blur
The dissension on the Mukalla strike broke up a fragile sharing of responsibilities. The separatist group seeking autonomy or independence in the south, the STC, had in late 2025 made quick territorial advances in the south, alarming Riyadh that it would be split at its south. Saudi officials considered the move as a preventive measure against the STC being able to further stir up the region and create an external supply line, while for the STC and local campaigners the intrusion into southern autonomy and foreign influence was a cause for concern. The impact on operations was evident: mass withdrawals and the step-by-step erosion of collaborative platforms in Yemen and loss of control of the front line and supply routes left the situation uncertain.
A Cold War With Hot Fronts
It is not a conventional interstate war, it is a miniature Cold War – visions being pitted against each other, low-level rivalry which is never going to be the real deal, proxy warfare and the periodic sparks of kinetic energy, which are never going to be the real thing but build dangerous momentum. One such trend in recent scholarly and policy literature is the UAE’s policy of supporting nodes and corridors (ports, militia alliances, commercial footholds) and its push for state-centric buffer zones and for active security management. The potential for such strategic incompatibility has also made miscalculation a real possibility, and tactical incidents such as Mukalla could quickly become a strategic crisis. But scholarly analysis of King’s and college regional policy now warns that these rivalries might just realign the region without ever declaring official enmity.
The Humanitarian and Strategic Costs
The human impact is also quite heavy, apart from geopolitics. Despite the passage of several years, Yemen is still one of the biggest humanitarian crises in the world: the UN and aid groups reported at the end of 2025 that millions were in urgent need, the healthcare sector was weak, and in several governorates, food security was increasingly becoming critical. The impacts of port, shipping and border controls are also direct humanitarian effects, including delays in aid deliveries, reduced commercial imports and increased economic devastation for already vulnerable communities.
When Gulf partners have a dispute, this results in disruptions to maritime security and to commercial insurance, which raises insurance premiums, rerouting of traffic and disruption to the supply chain which can spillover to other regions.
What Next: Deterrential, Diplomatic or Drifting?
For the policy makers there are two hard choices to be made regarding the Mukalla incident. They may maintain a negotiated cease-fire in a strenuous diplomatic effort (a very tough road to take) or both capitals may use analogies and assurances on the local level, and accept less of a level of competition. The third alternative is the unintended drift: unpredictable strikes, retaliatory action, and the erosion of regional coordination, which the principal actors have tried to avoid.
Outsourced forces – particularly the United States and European allies – have limited influence but can link security cooperation to clear de-escalation incentives. Hence, regional analysts and think tanks now call for two tracks: one emergency, one longer-term, and a discussion of red lines, deconfliction mechanisms and a common approach to Yemen’s fragile transition.
The future of the Gulf might depend more on Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, and their ability to handle their disagreements, than on their response to foreign threats, if December is a guide. In the Middle East, a more subtle Cold War seems to be developing, not for ideological reasons but because of different forms of influence, and the first sparks of conflict are already challenging the region’s capacity to control escalation.
